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Abstract
In this paper we generalize the definition of a multilinear map to arbitrary groups and de-
velop a novel idea of multilinear cryptosystem using nilpotent group identities.
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1 Introduction
In recent years multilinear maps have attracted attention in cryptography community. The idea has
been first proposed by Boneh and Silverberg [1]. For n > 2 the existence of n-linear maps is still an
open question. One of the main applications of multilinear maps is their use for indistinguishability
obfuscation. For example in [5] Lin and Tessaro proved that trilinear maps are sufficient for the
purpose of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation. Recently, Huang [3] constructed cryptographic
trilinear maps that involve simple, non-ordinary abelian varieties over finite fields.
Group-based cryptography has some new direction to offer to answer this question. A bilinear
cryptosystem using the discrete logarithm problem in matrices coming from a linear representation
of a group of nilpotency class 2 has been proposed in [7].
In this paper, we propose multilinear cryptosystems using identities in nilpotent groups, in which
the security is based on the discrete logarithm problem.
2 Multilinear Maps in Cryptography
Let n be a positive integer. For cyclic groups G and GT of prime order p, a map e : G
n → GT is said
to be a (symmetric) n-linear map (or a multilinear map) if for any a1, . . . , an ∈ Z and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G,
we have
e(ga11 , . . . , g
an
n ) = e(g1, . . . , gn)
a1...an
and further e is non-degenerate in the sense that e(g, . . . , g) is a generator of GT for any generator
g of G.
1
2.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Graded Encoding Schemes
One of the interesting importance of multilinear maps arises in the notion of one of the revolution
which swept the world of cryptography, namely fully homomophic encryption (FHE). The intuition
is that FHE ciphertexts behave like the exponents of group elements in a multilinear map, the so
called graded encoding scheme [2]. Such a scheme is a family of efficient cyclic groups G1, . . . , Gn of
the same prime order p together with efficient non-degenerate bilinear pairings e : Gi ×Gj → Gi+j
whenever i+ j ≤ n. In other words, if we fix a family of generators gi of the Gi’s in such a way that
gi+j = e(gi, gj), we can add exponents within a given group Gi
gai · g
b
i = g
a+b
i ;
and multiply exponents from two groups Gi, Gj as long as i+ j ≤ n:
e(gai , g
b
j) = g
a·b
i+j .
This makes gai somewhat similar to an FHE encryption of a.
2.2 Generalization of Multilinear Maps to any Group
Here we generalize the definition of a multilinear map to arbitrary groups G and GT . We say that
a map e : Gn → GT is a (symmetric) n-linear map (or a multilinear map) if for any a1, . . . , an ∈ Z
and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G, we have
e(ga11 , . . . , g
an
n ) = e(g1, . . . , gn)
a1...an .
Notice that the map e is not necessarily linear in each component. In addition, we say that e is
non-degenerate if there exists g ∈ G such that e(g, . . . , g) 6= 1.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Nilpotent and Engel Groups
A group G is said to be nilpotent if it has a finite series
{1} = G0 < G1 < · · · < Gn = G
which is central, that is, each Gi is normal in G and Gi+1/Gi is contained in the center of G/Gi.
The length of a shortest central series is the (nilpotency) class of G. Of course, nilpotent groups of
class at most 1 are abelian. A great source of nilpotent groups is the class of finite p-groups, i.e.,
finite groups whose orders are powers of a prime p.
Close related to nilpotent groups is the calculus of commutators. Let g1, . . . , gn be elements of a
group G. We will use the following commutator notation: [g1, g2] = g
−1
1 g
−1
2 g1g2. More generally, a
simple commutator of weight n ≥ 2 is defined recursively by the rule
[g1, . . . , gn] = [[g1, . . . , gn−1], gn],
where by convention [g1] = g1. A useful shorthand notation is
[x,n g] = [x, g, . . . , g
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
].
For the reader convenience, we recall the following property of commutators:
[xy, z] = [x, z]y[y, z] and [x, yz] = [x, z][x, y]z for all x, y, z ∈ G. (1)
For further basic properties of commutators we refer to [9, 5.1].
It is useful to be able to form commutators of subsets as well as elements. Let X1, X2, . . . be
nonempty subsets of a group G. Define the commutator subgroup of X1 and X2 to be
[X1, X2] = 〈[x1, x2] |x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2〉.
More generally, let
[X1, . . . , Xn] = [[X1, . . . , Xn−1], Xn]
where n ≥ 2. Then, there is a natural way of generating a descending sequence of commutator
subgroups of a group, by repeatedly commuting with G. The result is a series
G = γ1(G) ≥ γ2(G) ≥ . . .
in which γn+1(G) = [γn(G), G]. This is called the lower central series of G and it does not in general
reach 1. Notice that γn(G)/γn+1(G) lies in the center of G/γn+1(G).
A useful characterization of nilpotent groups, in terms of commutators, is the following.
Lemma 3.1. A group G is nilpotent of class at most n ≥ 1 if and only if the identity [g1, . . . , gn+1] =
1 is satisfied in G, that is γn+1(G) = 1. In particular, in a nilpotent group of class n, the subgroup
γn(G) is central.
Among the best known generalized nilpotent groups are the so-called Engel groups. A group G
is called n-Engel if [x,n y] = 1 for all x, y ∈ G. If G is nilpotent of class n, then G is n-Engel. Also,
there are nilpotent groups of class n which are not (n− 1)-Engel. For example, given a prime p, the
wreath product G = Zp ≀ Zp is nilpotent of class p but not (p− 1)-Engel [4, Theorem 6.2].
Conversely, any finite n-Engel group is nilpotent, by a well-known result of Zorn [9, 12.3.4].
3.2 Nilpotent Group Identities
The next result is a straightforward application of (1), together with Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1 and let a be a nonzero integer. Then, for
all g1, . . . , gn ∈ G, we have
[[g1, . . . , gn−1]
a, gn] = [g1, . . . , gn]
a
and
[g1, . . . , gn−1, g
a
n] = [g1, . . . , gn]
a.
Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.3. Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1. Then
[g1, . . . , gi−1, g
ai
i , gi+1, . . . , gn] = [g1, . . . , gi−1, gi, gi+1, . . . , gn]
ai , (2)
for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ai ∈ Z\{0} and gi ∈ G.
Proof. We argue by induction on n. The case n = 2 is true by Lemma 3.2.
Let n > 2. Then G/γn(G) is nilpotent of class n− 1. Moreover, γn(G) is central by Lemma 3.1.
Hence the induction hypothesis gives
g := [g1, . . . , gi−1, g
ai
i , gi+1, . . . , gn−1] = [g1, . . . , gn−1]
ai mod γn(G).
It follows that g = [g1, . . . , gn−1]
aih where h ∈ γn(G). Since γn(G) is central, applying (1), we get
[g, gn] = [[g1, . . . , gn−1]
aih, gn] = [[g1, . . . , gn−1]
ai , gn]
and so
[[g1, . . . , gn−1]
ai , gn] = [g1, . . . , gi−1, gi, gi+1, . . . , gn]
ai
by Lemma 3.2.
Let G be a nilpotent group of class n > 1 and g1, . . . , gn ∈ G. According to Proposition 3.3 for
any a1, . . . , an ∈ Z\{0}, we have
[ga11 , . . . , g
an
n ] = [g1, . . . , gn]
∏
n
i=1
ai .
Therefore we can construct the multilinear map e : Gn → G given by
e(g1, . . . , gn) = [g1, . . . , gn].
Similarly, given x ∈ G, we can consider the multilinear map e′ : G(n−1) → G given by
e′(g1, . . . , gn−1) = [x, g1, . . . , gn−1].
Further, assuming that G is not (n − 1)−Engel, one can take x ∈ G in such a way that e′ is
non-degenerate. In fact there exists g ∈ G such that [x,n−1 g] 6= 1.
4 Multilinear Cryptography using Nilpotent Groups
Here we propose two multilinear cryptosystems based on the identity (2) in Proposition 3.3.
4.1 Protocol I
First we generalize the bilinear map which has been mentioned in [7], to multilinear (n-linear) map
for n + 1 users. Let A1, . . . ,An+1 be the users with private exponents a1, . . . , an+1 respectively.
Given an integer a 6= 0, the main formula on which our key-exchange protocol is based on, is an
identity in a public nilpotent group G of class n > 1 (see Proposition 3.3):
[g1
a, g2, . . . , gn] = [g1, g2
a, . . . , gn] = [g1, g2, . . . , gn
a] = [g1, g2, . . . , gn]
a.
The users Aj ’s transmit in public channel
gi
aj , for i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n+ 1.
The key exchange works as follows:
• The user A1 can compute [g1
a2 , . . . , gn
an+1 ]a1 .
• The user Aj (j = 2, . . . , n) can compute
[g1
a1 , . . . , gj−1
aj−1 , gj
aj+1 , gj+1
aj+2 , . . . , gn
an+1 ]aj .
• The user An+1 can compute [g1
a1 , . . . , gn
an ]an+1 .
The common key is [g1, . . . , gn]
∏n+1
j=1 aj .
Example: Trilinear Cryptography using Nilpotent Groups of class 3. Let A,B, C,D be
the users with private exponents a, b, c, d respectively. The users A, B, C and D transmit in public
channel
xa, ya, za, xb, yb, zb, xc, yc, zc, xd, yd, zd respectively.
The key exchange works as follows:
• The user A can compute [xb, yc, zd]a.
• The user B can compute [xa, yc, zd]b.
• The user C can compute [xa, yb, zd]c.
• The user D can compute [xa, yb, zc]d.
The common key is [x, y, z]abcd.
4.2 Protocol II
Let G be a public nilpotent group of class n + 1 which is not n-Engel (n ≥ 1). Then there exist
x, g ∈ G such that [x,n g] 6= 1. Suppose that n + 1 users A1, . . . ,An+1 want to agree on a shared
secret key. Each user Aj selects a private nonzero integer aj , computes g
aj and sends it to the other
users. Then:
• The user A1 computes [x
a1 , ga2 , . . . , gan+1 ].
• The user Aj (j = 2 . . . , n), computes [x
aj , ga1 , . . . , gaj−1 , gaj+1 , . . . , gan+1 ].
• The user An+1 computes [x
an+1 , ga1 , . . . , gan ].
Hence, again by Proposition 3.3, each user obtains [x,n g]
∏n+1
j=1 aj which is the shared key.
5 Security and Platform Group
The security of our protocols is based on the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). The ideal platform
group for our protocols must be a nonabelian nilpotent group of large order such that the nilpotency
class is not too large and the DLP in such a group is hard. Please note that we do not suppose that
the group is presented by generating elements and defining relators or as a subgroup of a triangular
matrix group over a prime finite field (in finite case) or over the ring of integers (in torsion-free case).
In [10], Sutherland has studied the DLP in finite abelian p-groups, and showed how to apply the
algorithms for p-groups to find the structure of any finite abelian group.
In a series of papers by Mahalanobis, the DLP has been studied for finite p-groups but mostly for
nilpotent groups of class 2 [6, 8]. In particular, in [7], Mahalanobis and Shinde proposed p-groups
of class 2 in which the platform is not practical as showed by the authors.
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